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Abstract
Open source software is released under an open source license giv-
ing individuals the right to use, modify, and redistribute freely the
programs. This paper proposes a model of diﬀerentiated duopoly in
which ﬁrms invest in the development of proprietary or open source
software. The main ﬁndings are: (i) ﬁrms invest more when the prod-
ucts are substitutes; (ii) for substitute products, ﬁrms’ investment in
software development is greatest when the software is open source;
(iii) for close to perfect complements, ﬁrms’ investment in software
development is greatest when the software is proprietary; and (iv) for
substitute products, investment in open source software yields higher
proﬁts than investment in proprietary software.
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11 Introduction
Open source software is typically developed by volunteers from around the
globe and has attracted considerable interests in recent years. Typing “open
source” in Google yields more than 640 million hits; almost three times as
many as the old favourite “sex.” In its ﬁrst article on the topic, The Econo-
mist (1999a) concluded the following about ﬁrms’ investment in open source
software:
It is too early to say whether such approaches will work. But
open-source is here to stay.
Exactly six years later, The Economist (2005)’s opening sentences in a recent
article on the topic were:
The computing industry has been transformed by open-source
software, threatening business models while creating lucrative op-
portunities for some ﬁrms. Might the same happen in biotech-
nology?
Clearly, much has happened in a short period if time, and this was largely
unexpected.
So what exactly is open source? While it now refers to a mode of infor-
mation production (Benkler (2002)), the term open source originated with a
particular type of software development. Open source software are programs
released under an open source licence. An open source license gives individ-
uals the right to use, modify, and redistribute freely open source software.
A necessary condition to exercise these rights is free access to the program’s
source code. The source code is the human readable set of instructions that
makes up a program – e.g., programs written in C, C++, or Java. This is in
contrast to the object code, which is the translation of the source code into
the computer-readable language, a series of 0’s and 1’s – the binaries, or the
executable ﬁle. Consequently, open source software implies that anyone can
study the source code of a program and contribute to its development. Free
access to the source code implies making a proﬁt from the direct sale of the
program is diﬃcult since at all time the source code must be included, and
can be freely redistributed. In general, open source software are developed
by loosely organised teams of volunteers scattered around the planet and
2connected via the Internet.1
Why has open source software attracted so much attention? Lerner and
Tirole (2002) give three reasons:
1. the rapid diﬀusion of open software;
2. the signiﬁcant capital investments in open source projects; and
3. the new organisational structure underpinning open source projects.
Several open source software dominate their market. One of the most
talked about open source software is the web-server Apache whose market
share has further increased to approximately 70 percent in May 2005.2 This
implies more than two thirds of the Internet rely on Apache. Other examples
include: Sendmail that processes almost all e-mails sent over the Internet;
GNU/Linux, the operating system argued to be Microsoft Windows’ most
ﬁerce competitor; and Wikipedia, the free high-quality encyclopedia started
in 2001 and written collaboratively by many of its readers.3
Furthermore, the growth in the number of open source projects is as-
tonishing. Sourceforge.net is the major incubator of open source software.4
According to Lerner and Tirole (2005), the number of projects hosted by
Sourceforge.net was around 40,000 in early 2002. By May 2005, the number
of projects had more than doubled and exceeded 100,000.5
Firms are increasingly using and supporting open source software. In
recent years, Fortune 500 companies have initiated programs to implement
open source programs in their organisation. Large IT corporations including
Hewlett-Packard, Sun, IBM, Apple, and AOL have invested large sums of
1More information on the history and development of open source software can be
found in DiBona et al. (1999), Wayner (2000), Raymond (2001), Lerner and Tirole (2002),
and Fink (2003).
2http://news.netcraft.com/ (Accessed 16 May 2005). Netcraft’s survey queries server
across the Internet. The results of the May 2005 survey that queried more than 63 million
sites revealed Apache’s market share was 69.37 percent compared to 20.54 percent for
Microsoft.
3Wikipedia counts more than half a million articles for its English version only. For
more information on Wikipedia, visit http://en.wikipedia.org/ (Accessed 16 May 2005).
4For more information on Sourceforge.net, see http://sourceforge.net/index.php (Ac-
cessed 12 December 2004) and Lerner and Tirole (2005).
5As of May 2005, there were 100,054 registered projects and 1,072,901 registered users
on http://sourceforge.net/ (Accessed 15 May 2005).
3money in the development of open source software, and directly and indi-
rectly support the development of popular projects.6 Other companies like
Red Hat and VA Linux have attracted the attention of the media by being the
ﬁrst distributors of open source software to ﬂoat their company on the stock
exchange (The Economist, 1999b). In addition to corporations, many gov-
ernments around the world are turning to open source to avoid being tied to
a proprietary standard, and to reduce expenditure while increasing security.
Some of the pro-open source governments have instigated the development
of critical open source software. Prominent examples are the joint eﬀort of
China, South Korea, and Japan regarding the development of a native Asian
version of the GNU/Linux operating system, and the support of the German
government for the development of GPG, a critical cryptographic software.
The success of open source software suggests a new mode of production
which challenges traditional business models. Analysts have started investi-
gating whether the open source model could be applied to areas other than
software, including medical research, biotechnology, education, and academic
research. Open source software raise four broad questions: (i) Why do top
developers contribute their skilled labour for free? (ii) What characteristics
make open source communities sustainable and evolve over time? (iii) How
do proprietary software ﬁrms compete with open source communities? (iv)
What determines ﬁrms’ investment in developments that beneﬁts their direct
competitors? This paper contributes some answers to (iv) above. More for-
mally, we provide some answers on the following question: Why do for-proﬁt
ﬁrms invest in open source software?
The economic literature on open source software has largely concentrated
on the motivation of open source developers (Dempsey et al., 1999; Lerner
and Tirole, 2002; Benkler, 2002; Johnson, 2002; Ghosh et al., 2002; Hann
et al., 2002; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; Hertel et al., 2003; Rossi, 2004).
The results of a few years of intensive research show that what appeared
ﬁrst as a puzzle to economists could be largely explained by standard eco-
nomic theory. However, an extensive literature search failed to reveal any
paper published in a refereed journal that analysed the eﬀect of the devel-
opment regime – proprietary or open source – on ﬁrms’ investment decision
in software development. The major contribution of this paper to the eco-
nomics of open source software is to derive the relationship between market
6Lerner and Tirole (2004) report IBM has spent over USD 1 billion on open source
software development in 2001.
4structure, development regime and investment in software development. The
main ﬁndings of the paper are:
1. ﬁrms invest more in the development of their software when the prod-
ucts are substitutes;
2. in the case the products are substitutes, ﬁrms’ investment in software
development is greatest when the software is open source;
3. in the case the products are close to perfect complements, ﬁrms’ in-
vestment in software development is greatest when the software is pro-
prietary; and
4. in the case the products are substitutes, investment in open source
software yields higher proﬁts than investment in proprietary software.
Consequently, our results yield sharp predictions regarding observable
conditions that make the wide spread adoption of open source software more
likely. Take for example the case of the numerous commercial distributions
of the GNU/Linux operating system. Linux distributors, some of which are
listed on the stock exchange, sell close to perfect substitute products (includ-
ing the GNU/Linux operating system and services), and contribute actively
to the development of the Linux kernel and its related applications, which
are common to all. After several years of operations, none of the commercial
distributors went bankrupt, the development of the GNU/Linux operating
system increased dramatically, and the quality of GNU/Linux made it the
ﬁercest competitor to the quasi-monopolist proprietary Microsoft Windows.
Such examples are well captured by our model.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses
the diﬀerent types of open source license and their impications for developers.
Section 3 reviews the relevant literature. Section 4 presents the assumptions
of the model. Section 5 analyses the solutions. Section 6 and Section 7
investigate the eﬀect of market structure and development regime on software
development. Section 8 discusses the results using a numerical example, and
Section 9 concludes.
2 Open Source licenses and Business Models
Open source has become a relatively broad deﬁnition encompassing a great
variety of open source licences allowing individuals and for-proﬁt ﬁrms to
5interact in diﬀerent ways.7
2.1 Open Source Licenses
Open Source licenses can be segregated in two broad category: Copyleft and
BSD-type.8
The ﬁrst version of the General Public License (GPL) embodied reci-
procity. Reciprocity requires all modiﬁcations and extensions to a program
to be released and distributed under the same license; a requirement code-
named copyleft.9 Under copyleft, the developer of an original OSS beneﬁts
from the modiﬁcations or extensions made by a third party to the original
software in the same way the third party, making the modiﬁcations, initially
beneﬁted from the original software. Mixing proprietary and copylefted code
is not possible as the license requires the proprietary portion of the code to
become open source. This prevents for-proﬁt ﬁrms appropriating and exploit-
ing open source developments and innovations in their proprietary products
(Lerner and Tirole, 2005). Nevertheless, the GPL does not forbid the use of
OSS together with proprietary software.
Coexisting with copyleft licences are BSD-type licences which do not en-
force reciprocity. Under BSD-type licences, modiﬁcations to an open source
code need not be licensed under an open source license, and a third party is
not only allowed to keep private the new developments made on the code, but
can release the whole modiﬁed program under a proprietary license. As there
is in principle no risk of contaminating proprietary code (as it is the case with
copylefted code), BSD-type licences are very popular among for-proﬁt ﬁrms
and organisations.10
2.2 Business Models
While making money from the direct sale of OSS is rather diﬃcult, there are
many examples of companies such as Red Hat, Apple Computers, Netscape,
7See Lerner and Tirole (2005) for an investigation of the determinants of open source
license choice by individuals and ﬁrms.
8See Fink (2003, Chap. 3) for a comprehensive and practical discussion of the most
popular open source licences.
9The term copyleft was chosen as a wordplay on copyright; see
http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/ (Accessed 18 January 2005).
10See Fink (2003, pp. 42-45) for a brief description of diﬀerent BSD-type licenses.
6and O’Reilly Associates successful making proﬁts using OSS. There are presently
four business models using OSS, called indirect sale-value models by Ray-
mond (2000): Support sellers, loss-leaders, widget frosting, and accessoris-
ing.
2.2.1 Support Sellers
Support sellers generate revenue from the sale of services which complement
existing OSS. Typical examples of support sellers include commercial Linux
distributors such as Red Hat, Novell/Suse, Mandrake, and Red Flag.11 Com-
mercial distributors typically make revenue through the sale of substantially
diﬀerentiated and specialised services – e.g., bundled updates, specialised
and customised consultancy services, and after-sale customer service – com-
plementary to the free Linux distribution.
Every commercial distributor beneﬁt from improvements made on the
Linux kernel (the core of the GNU/Linux operating system), and thus have
an incentive to commit resources to its development. However, we expect
ﬁrm’s decision invest in the development of the kernel to be hindered by the
presence of strong spillovers due to the copyleft license and the fact Linux
distributions are gross substitutes. As a result, we expect commercial distrib-
utors to allocate more resources to the development of the complementary
applications and services that do not beneﬁt competitors.
2.2.2 Loss-Leader or Market Positioner
A ﬁrm selling complementary software may strategically choose to release one
of its software under an open source license to become the loss-leader keeping
the other programs proprietary. While it means foregoing direct revenue from
the sale of the newly open program, the ﬁrm beneﬁts from increased proﬁt
induced by the increased sales of its complementary proprietary programs.
Opening a proprietary code is an attractive strategy if the software is lagging
behind a leader, and may have to be discontinued in the near future (Lerner
and Tirole, 2004).
Netscape is an example of a ﬁrm successful implementing this strategy. In
the late 1990s, at the time Microsoft started bundling Internet Explorer with
Microsoft Windows, revenues from the sale of Netscape’s Internet browser,
11As of January 2005, there are 339 Linux distributions recorded on
http://distrowatch.com/stats.php (Accessed 27 January 2005).
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the cost of opening the browser was low; yet, if the browser remained in
the market, the possibility of making proﬁt from the sale of complementary
products such as Netscape Enterprise Server increased. In addition, it made
the ascension of Internet Explorer as a monopoly impossible, and reassured
current users the software would not disappear (Raymond (2000) and Lerner
and Tirole (2004)).
The Mozilla Foundation was created to guarantee the consistent devel-
opment of Mozilla, the open source version of Navigator, and its derivatives
Firefox (an Internet browser) and Thunderbird (an e-mail client). As of Jan-
uary 2005, Firefox alone has 18 million users, and an increasing adoption
rate, and became a serious threat to Microsoft’s Internet Explorer.13
2.2.3 Widget Frosting
Widget frosting is generally used by hardware manufacturers for whom the
software component of their product is largely a cost, and most of the ﬁrms’
proﬁt is contributed by the sale of hardware.
A prominent example is Apple Computers who, in 1999, decided to make
the kernel of its new operating system (OS), Mac OS X, open source.14 Ap-
ple’s OS blends an open source kernel with other proprietary technologies
and software that make up the complete OS, and run exclusivley on Ap-
ple’s computers. The result was a substantial reduction development costs
without decreasing users’ willingness to pay for the computer.
Another example of widget frosting is the pervasive adoption of Linux
in embedded applications such as smart phones. Smart phones are third-
generation (3G) mobile phones that rely on operating systems similar to the
one used on PCs. Motorola was the ﬁrst manufacturer to implement Linux
on one of its smart phones in 2003 while retaining proprietary systems – such
as Microsoft’s Windows Mobile OS, and Symbian OS – on other models. Mo-
torola was was followed by Samsung, E28, NEC and Panasonic/Matsushita in
2004. Interestingly, the market for smart phones brings two business models
12See Gilbert and Katz (2001)’s An Economist’s Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft for more
details about the court case against Microsoft that followed the shady bundling practice.
13See http://www.mozilla.org/ (Accessed 18 January 2005) for more information and
Hamm (2005) reporting on the growing market share of the Firefox browser in the U.S.
14For more, visit: http://developer.apple.com/darwin/projects/darwin/ (Accessed 10
January 2005).
8together: support sellers providing the commercial Linux distribution, and
smart phone manufacturers engaging in widget frosting.
2.2.4 Accessorising
Accessorising refers to ﬁrms selling accessories to OSS (Raymond, 2000).
Accessories range from typical branding items such as T-shirts and mugs, to
high-end documentation. O’Reilly & Associates’ involvement in open source
began in 1991 with the publication of Programming Perl, a complete reference
on the Perl programming language co-authored by Larry Wall, the creator
of Perl.15 Part of O’Reilly’s business strategy is to employ full time key
developers of popular OSS, such as Larry Wall, to further in any way they
like the development of the open source applications. Having key developers
as major contributor give O’Reilly a quasi-monopolistic status.
Nevertheless, there exist some spillover eﬀects as improvement of OSS
triggers greater demand for documentation, which is beneﬁcial for all pub-
lishers. However, this type of spillover is diﬀerent from the ones addressed
above since contributing to OSS does not improve the quality of other ﬁrms
products, but rather gives every publisher access to a greater market.
3 Some Recent Contributions
As pointed out by Lerner and Tirole (2004), analysis of situations where
there is direct competition between proprietary software and OSS is relatively
scarce. Two working papers providing some preliminary results are Gaudeul
(2004) and Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2003). The two studies con-
struct a model of duopoly involving a ﬁrm developing a proprietary software
substitute to an OSS developed by a group individuals. Gaudeul (2004) was
inspired by the development of L ATEX.16 The main assumptions in Gaudeul
(2004) were that open source developers concentrate their eﬀort on the num-
ber of features – highly valued by advanced users – rather than on the de-
velopment of a comprehensive graphical user interface (GUI) – highly valued
15Perl stands for Practical Extraction and Report Language, for a concise history of the
program and its development, see Lerner and Tirole (2002).
16L ATEX is a high-quality typesetting system, with features designed for the production
of technical and scientiﬁc documentation. For more information see http://www.latex-
project.org/ (Accessed 11 May 2005).
9by basic users.17 Furthermore, the open source team may lack co-ordination
leading to code being written twice, or not at all. Proprietary ﬁrms, on the
other hand, with the aim of targeting the larger population of basic users,
concentrate on the development of the program’s GUI at the expense of a
larger set of features. The results were (i) if it emerges, the OSS will be used
by either low-income consumers who cannot aﬀord a proprietary license, or
by advanced users who value the number of sophisticated features, and (ii)
as long as it does not discourage the development of the proprietary software
with the more complete interface, OSS may lead to a rise in welfare.
The work of Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2003) was inspired by
the growing success of GNU/Linux in a market dominated by Microsoft Win-
dows. In their duopoly model, two operating systems are competing where
one is available at no cost. The main feature of the model is a demand re-
sponsive to the systems’ market share. That is, a larger market share makes
the software more attractive from a user’s perspective. One implication of
the model is that the ﬁrm will charge a lower price when competing with
the open source alternative. However, sharing the market implies a market
share less than 100 percent. This in turn leads to a lower valuation of the
proprietary software by the consumers, than in the case of monopoly. The
intuition behind this result is given by considering third-party complemen-
tary products. A lower market share for one of the alternatives implies a
lower incentive for a third party ﬁrm to develop complementary products,
making the alternative less attractive. Therefore, and similarly to Gaudeul
(2004), the model cannot give unambiguous predictions about welfare when
an OSS competes directly with proprietary software.
Another working paper analysing for-proﬁt ﬁrms’ investment in OSS is
Henkel (2004). Henkel (2004) was motivated by the increasing number of
embedded devices, such as the ones discussed in section 2.2.3. He develops
a duopoly model of quality competition. In the model, ﬁrms require two
complementary technologies as inputs. The two technologies are of diﬀerent
relative importance to the two ﬁrms. Firms can choose to develop one or
both technologies, and can choose to keep private or make public their de-
17While this assumption is representative of the early OSS, it is no longer valid for
a large number of projects. Indeed many OSS concentrate on the development of GUI
and Desktop Environment similar to Microsoft Windows and Apple Macintosh OS. Two
leading open source desktop environments are KDE and GNOME; see http://www.kde.org
(Accessed 11 December 2004) and http://www.gnome.org (Accessed 11 December 2004)
for more information.
10velopments. The main ﬁndings are as follows. When the technology is open
source, an equilibrium exists where each ﬁrm specialises in the development
of one technology. When the goods are substitutes, but close to independent:
(i) a duopoly emerges if the technologies are kept private but does not emerge
otherwise, and (ii) proﬁts are higher when the technologies are open source
than when they are proprietary. When the goods are substitutes, but close
to independent, and/or the heterogeneity of the need for the two technologies
is high: (i) the quality of the product is higher under the open source regime,
and (ii) full disclosure of innovation by both ﬁrms is an equilibrium when the
degree of openness is endogenised.
Clearly, the variety of business models and open source licences makes
it diﬃcult to construct a general model of ﬁrms’ involvement in OSS. The
above contributions addressed diﬀerent questions associated with diﬀerent
types of OSS. Therefore, one must bear in mind the results might only hold
for a limited number of cases, and might be sensitive to the key assumptions.
As explained in section 2.1, there are two broad categories of licences: BSD-
type licences which allow ﬁrms to keep their developments on an existing OSS
private; and copyleft licences, such as the GPL, which enforce reciprocity. It
follows, altering the assumption with respect to the type of licence used could
alter the conclusion of the model. In the above, Gaudeul (2004) was inspired
by the L ATEX project released under a BSD-type license. His model however
assumed the software is released under a GPL license. Since his results are
consistent with what was observed with the L ATEX project, one may wonder
what eﬀect assuming a BSD-type license would have on the results. The
work of Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2003) and Henkel (2004) was
inspired by GNU/Linux for personal computers and embedded devices. The
two authors consequently assumed the software developed in their model is
released under GPL. Hence, the results apply to copyleft software, a subset
of open source software.
4 The Model
Consider two ﬁrms producing a single good made up of two components,
one of which is software. The goods may range from perfect complements to
perfect substitutes. The demand for the ﬁrm’s good is responsive to changes
in quality, and changes in prices. Now, consider a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst
stage, ﬁrms may choose to increase the quality of their product by investing in
11the development of the software component. We assume the cost of increasing
the quality of the product is known in advance by the ﬁrm so there is no
uncertainty about the outcome. When the ﬁrms are using an OSS in their
product, and all, or part of it, is common to both ﬁrms, there exists a spillover
eﬀect. When we assume the software being developed/improved is released
under GPL, the reciprocity requirement implies any developments made by
one ﬁrm also beneﬁt the other ﬁrm. If, on the other hand, ﬁrms develop
proprietary software, no such spillover eﬀect exists. In the second stage of the
game, ﬁrms engage in Bertrand competition to set the price of their product.
This model aims to answer the following two questions: (i) how do diﬀerent
market structures aﬀect the quality improving investment decision, and (ii)
what is the impact of the presence of spillovers on investment decisions.
4.1 A Demand System and the Duality of Duopoly
The two classical reference points for discussions of imperfect competition are
the Cournot and Bertrand models. The former uses quantity as the strategic
variable, while the latter uses price. The duality of the Cournot and Bertrand
models in diﬀerentiated duopoly was ﬁrst noted by Sonnenschein (1968), and
further analysed by Singh and Vives (1984) in a paper which extends Dixit
(1979). In order to analyse diﬀerent market structures, our model uses Singh
and Vives (1984)’s demand system. The properties of the demand system
are outlined below.
Consider an economy composed of a monopolistic sector, and a compet-
itive sector. The monopolistic sector is made up of two ﬁrms producing a
diﬀerentiated good, and the competitive sector is treated as the num´ eraire
sector. There is a single type of consumer with a utility function separable
and linear in the num´ eraire good. This implies there are no income eﬀects
on the monopolistic sector, and so, we can perform partial equilibrium analy-
sis concentrating on the monopolistic sector alone. Assume a representative
consumer has the following quadratic utility function,





1 + 2γq1q2 + β2q
2
2) (1)
where qi is the quantity of good i, and pi its price. For U to be concave over
the domain of interest, we assume αi and βi are > 0, βiβj − γ2 > 0, and
αiβj − αjγ > 0 for i  = j, and i = 1,2. A composite good representing all
other goods can be modelled by adding an extra term which enters the utility
12function linearly (See Dixit (1979), and H¨ ackner (2000)), but is not included
since it does not change the analysis.







The ﬁrst order conditions of the above problem yield the following linear
inverse demands functions for product 1 and product 2:
p1 = α1 − β1q1 − γq2 (3)
p2 = α2 − γq1 − β2q2 . (4)
The above demand functions are deﬁned in the region where prices are pos-
itive. Because we are dealing with linear demand functions, an inverse func-
tion exists and corresponds to the direct demand functions:
q1 = a1 − b1p1 + cp2 (5)
q2 = a2 + cp1 − b2p2 . (6)
Where ai = (αiβj − αjγ)/δ, bi = βi/δ, c = γ/δ, and δ = β1β2 − γ2 for
i  = j, and i = 1,2. By assumption, ai and bi are positive, and the condition
for U to be concave is now b1b2 − c2 > 0. Furthermore, the direct demand
functions are deﬁned in the region where quantities are positive. That is,
where ai − bipi − cqj > 0, for i  = j, and i = 1,2.
Deﬁnition 4.1. The goods are substitutes, independent, or complements ac-
cording to whether γ is superior, equal, or inferior to 0 respectively.
That is, demand for good i is always downward sloping in its own price,
increases with increases in pj if the goods are substitute, and decreases with
increases in pj if the goods are complements. The goods are perfect substi-
tutes if α1 = α2 and β1 = β2 = γ. Furthermore, in the case αi = αj, γ2/βiβj
expresses the degree of product diﬀerentiation. For a positive γ, the closer
γ2/βiβj is to 1, the more homogeneous the market.18
18A word of caution: βi and βj in the above refers to the slope of the indirect demands.
This is not to be confused with β, which refers to the spillover rate introduced in the
below. Our model does not use the indirect functions, and hence the confusion should be
minimal.
13The two systems of equations show the duality of the problem. Clearly,
one can switch back and forth from the Cournot model to the Bertrand model
by simply interchanging the Greek letters with their Roman counterparts.
Hence, the duality allows one to prove two theorems for the price of one
(Varian, 1992, p. 295). When constructing a model of software development,
only Bertrand price competition appears reasonable. As such, this framework
is used below.
4.2 Software Development with Spillover
Denote by xi, ﬁrm i’s unit quality improvement corresponding to a particular
investment in an OSS. The cost schedule of quality improvement is known
by the ﬁrm, and is denoted by f(xi). The cost function for a unit quality
improvement f(xi) is quadratic such that f(xi) = φ(x2
i/2), where φ is a
constant. The quadratic cost function allows for diminishing returns due to
capacity restrictions.19
Firm i’s product quality is indexed by ai the intercept of its product’s
direct demand curve. Let ai be a linear function of ﬁrm i’s eﬀective quality
improvement such that:
ai(xi,xj) = a + xi + βxj, (7)
where xi +βxj is ﬁrm i eﬀective quality improvement. Hence xi is the ﬁrm’s
own quality improvement, while βxj is the indirect quality improvement
leaking from ﬁrm j given an exogenous spillover rate β. In this context, β
takes some value between zero and one. A spillover of one implies ﬁrms are
investing in the development of OSS common to both ﬁrms – equivalent to
a public good – while a spillover rate of less than one implies only a portion
of the OSS are common to both ﬁrms. For example, consider the Linux
distributors discussed in section 2.2.1. While all distributors beneﬁt from
improvements on the Linux kernel, not all beneﬁt from improvement to the
OSS speciﬁc to each distributor. The parameter a is a benchmark index of
quality, and is assumed to be equal across ﬁrms at the start of the game.
That is, a is the status quo to which improvements can be made.
In what follows, we assume all software is released under a Copyleft li-
cense. Note however the above formulation of investment with spillovers can
19This formulation of cost is standard in models of R&D with spillover eﬀect. See for
instance d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
14also accommodate BSD-type licences. All that changes is the interpretation
of the parameter β. With GPL license, β refers to the portion of OSS com-
mon to both ﬁrms. With BSD-type licences, β is the degree to which ﬁrms
release their private development under the open source license.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we consider prices net of
marginal cost. Following Singh and Vives (1984) for a marginal cost mi
assumed to be constant and positive, we can replace αi and ai by αi − mi
and ai − bimi + cmj respectively. It follows that ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ function is
simply its proﬁt minus its cost of quality improvement. That is,
Πi(p;x) = piDi(p;x) − f(xi) , (8)
where p = (pi,pj), x = (xi,xj), and Di(p;x) is the direct demand for ﬁrm
i’s product.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the model in Section 5, let us inves-
tigate the dimensions of the above model. First, by using Singh and Vives
(1984)’s demand system, we are able to analyse situations where the ﬁrms in
the monopolistic sector produce goods ranging from perfect complements to
perfect substitutes. Second, our formulation of investment with spillovers in
section 4.2 allows us to compare the investment decision for ﬁrms producing
OSS (β > 0) with ﬁrms producing proprietary software (β = 0). Lastly, it is
possible to analyse ﬁrms’ investment decision with Copyleft and BSD-type
licences. The following concentrates on the case where ﬁrms develop a soft-
ware released under a Copyleft licence in the ﬁrst stage of the game, and
engage in Bertrand price competition in the second stage.
5 Analysis
Because we are looking for the Sub-Game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE),
we solve the game using backward induction.
5.1 Stage 2: Price Competition
Given history (xi,xj), we ﬁnd a Nash equilibrium in stage 2 in terms of action
proﬁle (pi,pj). The ﬁrst order conditions corresponding to Equation 8 are:
∂Πi(p;x)
∂pi
= ai(x) − 2bipi − cpj = 0, i  = j. (9)
15Solving equations 9 for pi yields the reaction functions of ﬁrm i for any price






i  = j . (10)
The above expression gives are the well known upward sloping best response
functions for Bertrand competition. Solving Equations 9 (i = 1,2) for p1 and
p2 yields the following equilibrium prices as a function of all level of quality





4bibj − c2 i  = j . (11)
Given our assumptions and the demand system, this equilibrium is a pure
strategy subgame equilibrium. Furthermore, it is unique and symmetric.
Proposition 5.1. The equilibrium price is increasing with an increase in the
quality of its own product, and is increasing, neutral, or decreasing with an
increase in the other ﬁrm’s product quality when the goods are substitutes,
















where D = 4bibj − c2. Given our assumption on the concavity of U, D is
always positive. Since demands are always downward sloping, bj is always
positive. Clearly ∂p⋆
i(x)/∂ai > 0, and the sign of ∂p⋆
i(x)/∂aj depends on the
sign of c.
5.2 Stage 1: Investment in Software Development
Substituting p⋆
i(x) into the proﬁt functions Πi(p,x), for i = 1,2, we derive
the reduced game as a function of the pair (xi,xj) and the other exogenous
parameters. Solving ∂Π1(x)/∂x1 = 0 and ∂Π2(x)/∂x2 = 0 for x1 and x2
yields the pair (x⋆
1,x⋆
2) which is the unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium
in stage 1. Unfortunately, the solutions generated by this problem do not lend
themselves well to straightforward interpretation. To continue our analysis,
16let us consider the case where b1 = b2 = b. From section 4.1, it follows the
goods are perfect substitutes when c = b, and are perfect complements when





φ(8b3 + c3) − 4b2(1 + cφ + β) − 2bc(cφ + β(1 + β))
, (13)





φ(8b3 + c3) − 4b2(1 + cφ + β) − 2bc(cφ + β(1 + β))
, (14)
for i = 1,2.
6 Investment and Market Structure
The results presented in Table 1 are the equilibrium values x⋆
i and p⋆
i given by
Equations 13 and 14 evaluated at c when the goods are perfect complements,
independent, and perfect substitutes. Propositions 6.1 and 6.2 show how the
equilibrium investment changes when the goods move from perfect comple-
ments to perfect substitutes. That is, how x⋆
i and p⋆
i change as c increases
from −b to b.
Proposition 6.1. A ﬁrm’s equilibrium quality improving investment is monoton-
ically increasing when the goods move from complements to substitutes.
Proof. We simply need to show x⋆
i is strictly increasing in c over [−b,b]. For
clarity of exposition, let us consider a full spillover, β = 1. The equilibrium
investment x⋆





(φ(4b2 + c2) − 4b(1 + cφ))
, i = 1,2 . (15)






(φ(4b2 + c2) − 4b(1 + cφ))2 , i = 1,2 . (16)
Clearly, ∂x⋆
i/∂c is superior, equal, or inferior to zero when c is inferior, equal,
or superior to 2b respectively. Under our assumptions, c is bounded by [−b,b].
17Table 1: Equilibrium Investment and Price
Relation between products:
Variable Complements Independent Substitutes











































18Hence, c < 2b always holds, implying ∂x⋆
i/∂c is strictly positive over [−b,b].
Clearly, the sign of ∂x⋆
i/∂c only depends on (2b−c). One can check that this
is true for any value of β between zero and one. While, the result is obvious
when diﬀerentiating Equation 13 with respect to c, the obtained derivative
is fairly large, and for this reason is not reported here.
Proposition 6.1 implies ﬁrms invest a greater amount of resources to im-
proving the quality of their product when the products are (gross) substitutes
than when they are (gross) complements. The intuition behind this result
is ﬁrms have a greater incentive to improve the quality of their product
when they face competition. When the ﬁrms are monopoly, the existence
of spillovers creates an incentive to collaborate while the pricing decisions of
the two ﬁrms are independent. When the ﬁrm are producing complementary
products, the more complementary the products, the more ﬁrms rely on each
others sales. That is, the more complementary are the goods, the more ﬁrms
free-ride on one another, which inhibits the incentive to improve the quality
of their own products.
Proposition 6.2. A ﬁrm’s equilibrium price is monotonically increasing
when the goods move from complements to substitutes.
Proof. The equilibrium price p⋆











, i = 1,2 , (17)
where x⋆ = (x⋆
1,x⋆
2) . Diﬀerentiating 17 with respect to c, and using the fact


















From the monotonicity of x⋆
i over [−b,b], it follows ∂p⋆
i(x⋆)/∂c is positive over
[−b,b]. Furthermore, similar to ∂x⋆
i/∂c, the sign of ∂p⋆
i(x⋆)/∂c only depends
on (2b − c) for any β between zero and one.
The result of Proposition 6.2 is expected since increasing the quality of
a product is costly for the two ﬁrms. That is, even when the ﬁrms produce
substitute goods, their cost increases by the same amount, and we expect
their equilibrium price to move in the same direction as costs.
197 Proprietary Software vs. Open Source Soft-
ware
Under the assumptions of the model, proprietary development is a special
case occurring when β = 0. Therefore, we can compare the investment
in software development when ﬁrms develop proprietary and open source
software for any market structure between perfect complements and perfect
substitutes. From section 4.2, β = 0 implies the quality parameter of a ﬁrm’s
product becomes:
ai(xi) = a + xi . (19)





(c − 2b)2(c + 2b)φ − 4b2 , (20)





(c − 2b)2(c + 2b)φ − 4b2 . (21)
Table 1 summarises the equilibrium x⋆
i and p⋆
i for the three extreme cases
including when the software is proprietary. From Proposition 6.1, equilibrium
investment and price are monotonically increasing when goods move from
complements to substitutes.
Having established the relationship between quality improving investment
and market structure, it is natural to investigate the eﬀect of diﬀerent devel-
opment regimes on quality improving investment for each market structures.
Proposition 7.1. A ﬁrm’s equilibrium quality improving investment is in-
creasing in the spillover rate when the goods are substitutes and independent,
but is decreasing in the spillover rate when the goods are close to perfect
complements.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating Equation 13 with respect β, one can check that ∂x⋆
i/∂β >
0 if and only if
c
4φ + 8b
3(1 + cφ) − 4b
2c(cφ − 2β) + 2bc
2(β
2 − cφ) > 0. (22)
For any positive b and φ, and any β between zero and one, the above inequal-
ity is always satisﬁed when c takes values in [0,b]. However, the inequality 22
20does not hold when c = −b and for values in the neighbourhood of −b. That
is ∂x⋆
i/∂β 6 0 for c ∈ [−b,e), where e ≪ 0. Unfortunately, a simple expres-
sion for this turning point could not be found.
Proposition 7.1 shows that the higher the spillover rate, the higher the in-
vestment in software development for monopoly and competing ﬁrms. This
implies that quality improving investment is greater when the software is
open source than when the software is proprietary. However, quality im-
proving investment for ﬁrms producing close to perfect complements is lower
when the software is open source than when it is proprietary. This result is
in line with the intuition of Proposition 6.1. It suggests a strong free-riding
eﬀect when ﬁrms produce close to perfect complements. For instance, ﬁrms
free-ride on each others’ sales when the software is proprietary, and free-ride
on both sales and on each others’ developments when the software is open
source.
8 Discussion: A Numerical Example
The above analysis can be illustrated using a simple numerical example.
Consider the model with parameters taking the values from Table 2. The
results of our propositions are general and hold for any downward sloping
demand curves, positive prices and quantities, and convex utility. From our
assumption on the demand curve, the own price elasticity of demand is −1
at the equilibrium point for the three extreme market structure, and for any
positive value b such that b1 = b2 = b. Each equilibrium is expressed as a
function of the indicator of market structure c ∈ [−1.5,1.5], corresponding
to the region on which the utility function is convex, and the spillover rate
β ∈ [0,1]. Recall the parameter φ is the slope of the marginal cost of quality
improving investment, and a is the benchmark index of quality. Figures 1, 2,
and 3 give a graphical representation of the equilibrium investment, price,
and proﬁt of a ﬁrm respectively.
The results of Propositions 6.1 and 7.1 are clearly illustrated by Figure 1.
Investment in software development increases when goods move from perfect
complements to perfect substitutes under both proprietary and open source
regimes. Investment is greatest when the goods are close to perfect substi-
tutes, and the spillover is highest. On the other hand, investment is lowest
when ﬁrms produce close to perfect complements, and is decreasing as the
spillover increases. That is, when the goods are close to perfect complements,






investment is lower under an open source regime. While Figure 1 shows a
rather ﬂat surface, the slope of the surface computed with the expressions of


















Figure 1: Equilibrium Investment, x⋆
i(c,β)
While based on diﬀerent assumptions, our model encompasses Henkel
(2004)’s model when the open source decision is not endogenised. Recall β
measures the degree to which ﬁrms’ (GPL) software are similar. Hence, the
measure of heterogeneity of need in the two technologies in Henkel (2004) is
equivalent to the spillover β in our model. Henkel (2004) shows when the
goods are substitutes but close to independent, and the heterogeneity of the
22need for the two technologies is high, the quality of the product is higher
under the open source regime. In our model, this situation occurs when c
takes a positive value close to 0, and we compare investment when β = 0
(proprietary) with investment when β is non-zero and low (OSS with high
heterogeneity). Clearly, this is consistent with the results of Proposition 7.1.
However, according to our model and using Henkel (2004)’s terminology,
investment increases as ﬁrms’ needs become more homogenous and as the

















Figure 2: Equilibrium Price, p⋆
i(c,β)
Henkel (2004) also shows when the goods are substitutes but close to
independent, proﬁts are higher when the technologies are open source than
when they are proprietary. Figure 3 shows equilibrium proﬁt, according to
our model, follows a similar pattern to investment. Here again, our results
are consistent with Henkel (2004). That is, when c takes a positive value
close to 0, ﬁrm’s equilibrium proﬁt when β = 0 is lower than when β is
non-zero and low. However, equilibrium proﬁt rises as ﬁrms’ needs become
more homogeneous, and the goods move closer toward perfect substitutes.
As shown in Figure 2, this occurs despite the fact equilibrium price rises
with equilibrium investment. The intuition is that while consumers react
negatively to prices, they react positively to increases in quality and are



















Figure 3: Equilibrium Proﬁt, Π⋆
i(c,β)
open source implies that greater quality can be reached at a lower cost. As
a result, ﬁrms’ proﬁt is highest when they invest in a common software, and
the goods are close to perfect substitutes. Therefore, both Henkel (2004) and
our model show that investments in OSS for competing ﬁrms is a strategic
complement, while the pricing decisions is a strategic substitute.
The emergence of the numerous Linux distributors discussed in section 2.2.1
clearly supports the above hypothesis. Linux distributors sell close to per-
fect substitutes (software plus services), and contribute actively to the de-
velopment of the Linux kernel and its related applications. That is, Linux
distributors are located where c is close to b and β is close to 1. Clearly, the
emergence of GNU/Linux as a ﬁerce competitor to the quasi-monopolist pro-
prietary platform Microsoft Windows, and the popularity of the ﬁrst Linux-
powered smartphones in an industry dominated by the proprietary Symbian
OS are well explained by our model.
9 Concluding Remarks
The model presented in this paper is the ﬁrst to derive the relationship
between market structure, development regime and investment in software
development from a formal model of diﬀerentiated duopoly. This approach
24allows for the complete and direct analysis of investment in software devel-
opment in the three dimensions: market, regime, and common technology.
We proposed and analysed a model of ﬁrms’ investment in software de-
velopment under diﬀerent market structures. We constructed a two-stage
game where ﬁrms chose ﬁrst how much resources to invest to improve the
software component of their product, and second, the price of their product.
The results were as follows: (i) ﬁrms invest more in the development of their
software when their products are substitutes for those of other producers; (ii)
in the case when the products are substitutes, ﬁrms’ investment in software
development is greatest when the software is open source; (iii) in the case
the products are close to perfect complements for those of other producers,
ﬁrms’ investment in software development is greatest when the software is
proprietary; and (iv) when the products are substitutes, investment in open
source software yields higher proﬁts than investment in proprietary software.
Last, we showed our model encompassed and extended the results of previous
works.
Future works (currently in progress) should focus on extending and gen-
eralising the model. A natural extension is to endogenise the development
regime. This could be done by considering a three-stage version of this model
where ﬁrms choose their regime in the second stage, and their investment de-
cision in the third stage. However, while solvable, our assumptions regarding
the demand system yield rather large and complex expressions. Therefore,
a more general formulation of the demand system with similar properties is
needed. One way to generalise the results to arbitrary demand functions is to
appeal to the theory of supermodular games introduced by Topkis (1978).20
Assuming a unique SPNE price and quantity exist in the second stage of
the game, we could derive the best response functions as functions of the
equilibrium investment. From the above, the reduced form game is char-
acterised by strategic complementarity. Hence, it can be shown the best
response correspondences for investment are in fact supermodular. Conse-
quently, all the results from the theory of supermodular games could be used
to analyse the equilibrium of the model without the assumptions of concavity
of the function, convexity of the set of arguments, or diﬀerentiability. Amir
and Wooders (2000) is an application of a supermodular game to two-period
duopoly R&D investment that could be adapted to the above situation.
20The theory of supermodular games and their application are extensively covered in
Topkis (1998) and Vives (1999).
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